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A t~e~~rc~~ is ;rrwed rebting the multichrvmatic number of a graph G to itl; selectivity 
[cl uonecpt staining to measures on the vetticsts of G). An extended form of this theorem 
is alw ptoved, snd its application t\j games defined on graphs is discussed. 
Let a graph G with vertex set given, and le 
derrott‘ the 4x2llection of i&pen element _x of 
thi3r.r a subset of V’such that no twro of the vertices in x are adjacent irl G. 
e shall ~ul~s~d~r the ~ollitc = {xi: 1 <iG 
islg an eI~~rn~~~~t x of the vector itI 
and 0 otherwise. 
nstc the set of robability measures on V; i.e., an element 
inatcs summing 
colors to each vertex of G in suoh a way that no two adjacent vertices 
have a cob in common. Thus a ( I .k)-multic~b-ing is just ;i k-coloring 
in the usual sense. We then have 
x*(G) = inf {k/r: G admits an (r,.k-l;n!l,lticolr,ril?g ). 
. We shall make u:;e of game theor&c results in Phe proof. and we 
shall use sbndard terminology from the theory of games without further 
exglanatkr; Isee, f0r example, [ 31 ). We dcfifie A to be the f X M matrix 
ilose ith row is _yi. The value of the game whase paysff matrix is A is 
{this is matrix multipkation, where vectors are columns and t denotes 
trarlspose‘). The set (p%Q : p in M, ) is the convex hull c:sf X, since each 
c“4 is simply a convex gzambina+ion f thle; rows of 14 r which are the ele- 
ments sf X. ft follows thaf the quarrtity in t I) iis equal to 
since tfte maximum of a linear function over a poiytope is achieved at 
the extreme points of the po’fytope. A measure m for whkh the minimum 
in f 1) 3s attained is an optimal mixed strategy for player C (the player 
hose strategies are the calumns of A). 
The celebrated minimax theorem of von Neuma~~n [ 3, Theorem 2.7. I 1 
ields the fact that o(G) is also equal to 
min 
m 
p*A m , 
ich this maximum is ar:tained is ~1 optimal mixed 
243 
Let c be the vector in 
(2) that 
whose every coordinate is 1. IIt fallows from 
(That is, &4 - u(G)c has ~tonnegat~v~ coordinates.) Since pO and a(G) 
are rational. there exists an integer k such that k,pO has integral coordi- 
tes and ku(G) is an integer. et r = ko(G), and let 0 in ’ be the vector 
kpO. l’he:~ (3) implies 
(4? &4l 2 ?2‘ . 
We shalt now c’onctruct an (r, k)-multicoloring of G. For each i, 
i*f 1. let c‘... 1 G j /if, be the labels of@ distinct colors (none if 
p” = 0). The to% number of such colors is 
C@=k &$=k. 
Assign to each vertex u of G all the colors cii such that v belongs to xi. 
Then if two vertices u and ~7 share a cotor cjj, we must have both u and 
cc’ in xi.’ nniO consequently uand NJ are not adjacent. Furthermore, (49 
may be interpreted as follows: for each i, the sum of the J3’ over the in- 
dicesj such that v,. belongs to _x~ isat least r. 
Equivalently. we have assigned at least r colors to each vertex (we may 
remove any excess colors in any fashion). From the definitions of & and 
r we havt kJr = I b(C) t and hence x*(G) < l/u(G). We now demonstrate  
the opposite inequality, which will complete the proof. ‘Let any (r, k)- 
multicoloring of G be given, and let tip 1 < i < k. be the set of vertices 
to which color i is assigned. Note that each ci belongs to X, and that the 
sum of the vectors ci is re. Now let any t?r in Mn be given. We have 
hence there must be an i SU& thbt ~YI l ci 2 r/k. 
Since this is true for any (r, 
ing facts: 
It is an immediate consequence of a thecPrem of Meyer (given irr [ 21) 
that u(G) is strictly greater than j if 6’ is planar. We uomhine this with 
heerem 1. I %I derive the foIlowing resJt Gale to Hilton et al. [ 2] : 
2. 
e nlebw dkws a more gznerai version af Thecxem 1.1. We are given 
a set V = {ai: I < i aS tt ) and a ookction X 2 {xi: I 6 i 6 l} of subsets 
define the (V, x) gauze as fullaws: player R &woses an elzmcnt 
nd player C’ an efement u in V. If u lies in X, we say C has been 
fcimd by K, and player C pays p1aye.r R one unit* If u does nat b&r>ng to 
*r na payment ensues. We kt O( V, X) be the V&M of this game (by defi- -*5 
n~t~~~? thequantity in ( I)). By the usual game theoretic interpretation. 
is the average amount per play of the game that R will win (or C 
both players play “rationally”. 
(r, k)-mtlltk0loring of V rel&ive to &il is an assignment from a total 
of k cotors of r colors to each clement air II/ such that for each calor, the 
subset sf V to which that c~~lcllr is assigned is a subset of some element 
of X. In the case where iv is the vertex set of a graph G anld X is the CC+ 
f&ion of independent subsets, this reduces to our previous concept of 
uiticoloration, and the fobwing result reduces to Theorem 1.1. 
any ones color, we 
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a connected graph G and two non-adjacent vertices t’O and u1 in G. 
Player R chooses any simple path from uO to uI , and player @ -hooses 
any vertex u except VO or u1 . If u lies on the path chosen by R, then I? 
collects a unit payment fror!a C, and otherwise no payment ensues. Upon 
repeated (rationai) playing of this game, what average payment will R 
receive per play? (That is, how often will R run across C ?) 
We place this game within the framework of Theorem 2. I by letting V 
be the vertic of G apart from vO and vy . and by taking for X the sets of 
vertices apart from vO and u1 that lie on simple paths from I’~ to ul. The 
value of the above game is then Q( V, X). (Note that G admits a Hadto- 
nian path from O to v1 iff o( V, X) = 1.) An (r, k)-multicoloring of V in 
this setting is an assignment of colors such that the set of vertices bearing 
any given color lie on some simple path from uO to v1 - 
Consider the above game on the graph G of Fig. 1. The indicated meas- 
ure on V shows that u( V, X) < 3, since no simple path from t+, trs v1 
amasses more than 3 of the weight. We may easily produce a (2,3)-multi- 
ring qf V relative to X, as shown. By Theorem 2.1 we dedu:e O( KX) 
ad hence the answer to the question is 3. 
S.W. Scott, A (< S)-colour theortxn for planru graphs, 
o-person Games f merican Ekvier. 
